Panel II: Public versus Private Environmental Regulation - Fourth Panelist by Sunstein, Cass R.
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship
1994
Panel II: Public versus Private Environmental
Regulation - Fourth Panelist
Cass R. Sunstein
Follow this and additional works at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cass R. Sunstein, "Panel II: Public versus Private Environmental Regulation - Fourth Panelist," 21 Ecology Law Quarterly 455 (1994).
PANEL II: PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE REGULATION
Panel II: Public Versus Private
Environmental Regulation
Cass R. Sunstein, Fourth Panelist*
I have to tell you I am a little discouraged with my topic, which is
the defense of democratic approaches to environmental protection.
In preparation for this, I really wanted to get a hold of the Vice Presi-
dent's report on reinventing the government.' So I called the Regula-
tory Affairs Office in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB),
and they said the person to call was the Public Affairs Office at OMB.
I called them and they said the person to call was the Vice President's
office. I called them and they said the person to call was the Govern-
ment Printing Office. It sounded very depressing. But I thought, well,
maybe that will work. So I went ahead and called the Government
Printing Office, and they said they could have it to me probably within
the month. (Laughter.)
I have heard subsequently that part of the Gore report says that
the Government Printing Office will have to compete with private en-
terprise, and that may explain their reluctance to send it out. (Laugh-
ter.) Undaunted, I am going to try to defend the democratic approach
to environmental problems. Much of what I have to say about private
remedies and public remedies will be through a democratic lens. It
might be more accurate to say that it is a republican approach, repub-
lican in the sense of what James Madison said in his theory of govern-
ment, designed to limit factional power and to foster public
deliberation. 2
Let me begin with a bill of particulars indicting common law ap-
proaches to environmental protection. This is just an effort to abstract
a bit from the familiar failures of private law. I guess this is a criti-
cism, a partial criticism at least, of free market environmentalism. It is
familiar that there are collective action problems with individually
small but, on aggregate, very large injuries, which a common law or
private market system will fail to address. So in cases in which there
are lots of people injured a little bit, the environmental damage may
be very high, but the common law will be unable to respond.
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In addition, it is very hard to get an adequately coordinated sys-
tem by using the common law, and this is potentially disastrous in the
environmental area. Litigation is focused on too few aspects of a
problem. It lacks the comprehensive overview that one would need,
for example, to come to terms with water pollution. Litigation is also
fortuitous in its timing. It is random and ex post. If you like the cur-
rent law of products liability, then you would love common law ap-
proaches to environmental protection, where the problems will
probably be even worse.
In addition to the collective action problems and the difficulty of
getting adequate coordination, there is a lack of necessary expertise in
the judiciary. Now, I see some judges in the room who actually know
a lot about environmental problems, but they are exceptions.
There is a concern about judges' lack of political accountability as
well. The truth in the Chevron opinion is the perception that where
there is a policy decision to be made, it ought to be made democrati-
cally and not judicially.3 Maybe a crisper way to make the point is to
say that if you had a common law system working really terrifically
well, kind of a Posner-Epstein heaven, what you would end up with is,
at best, aggregating private willingness to pay. You would produce a
system of wealth maximization in which you made policy choices by
aggregating private willingness to pay. That is what the common law
system and one idealized view of it is about.
But there is a big difference between democratic judgments about
social problems and aggregated willingness to pay. And in a demo-
cratic system, the democratic judgments ought to be preferred. This is
especially the case if what ought to matter in environmental policy
includes, as I think it should, the interests of future generations and, if
they will suffer, the interests of creatures who are not human. This is
not to say that those are decisive interests, but they are relevant inter-
ests, and they are not likely to be sufficiently included in the willing-
ness-to-pay criterion.
These various problems-collective action problems, lack of co-
ordination, lack of expertise, and democratic failures-suggest that a
common law system will be both inefficient and undemocratic. This
was the basic insight that led to the substitution of regulatory machin-
ery for the common law in the environmental area.
The story we have seen in the past twenty years has not been a
success, and, ironically, the dimensions along which it has failed are
very similar to the dimensions along which the common law itself
failed. As several of the previous panelists have suggested, the system
we now have is extraordinarily inefficient. By some estimates we have
3. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984).
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spent $900 billion for pollution control since 1972. I think $1000 bil-
lion is actually a trillion, but I was not entirely sure of that, so I took a
lower end of the estimate. $900 billion. (Laughter.) And many esti-
mates suggest that we could have achieved the same environmental
benefit at one-quarter of the cost.4
Not only is there great inefficiency in our command-and-control
system, but there is also democratic failure, above all in the influence
of well-organized factions over the regulatory machinery. It may be
that ethanol is really, really great and that governmental specification
of ethanol as the automobile motoring substance of choice would be a
good idea. But there is no doubt that the power of the ethanol
lobby-the farmer's lobby-has played a role in occasional govern-
mental enthusiasm for ethanol.
The democratic failure means that instead of democratic deliber-
ation-Madison's aspiration-we often have government by faction.
This problem is revealed, I think, by the cost-benefit charts published
by OMB that are reprinted amusingly and depressingly in Judge
Breyer's excellent new book on risk regulation. 5 These charts show
that the cost-per-life-saved of environmental regulations varies so
widely for different regulations that no sensible person could in the
first instance have advocated such regulations.6
Now to make a very simple argument, this discussion suggests
that the problems of the common law-lack of coordination, lack of
economic efficiency, lack of real application of expertise, and lack of
democratic deliberation-are just what we have now. I think it would
be difficult to contend that we would be better off under the common
law system. But certainly it would not be hard to argue that we are
not tremendously better off under the system we now have than we
would be under the common law system.
I want to make some simple recommendations. These reflect an
effort, principally from the democratic point of view, to synthesize the
best of traditional private law remedies-with a bow in the direction
of my colleagues, Epstein and Posner-with the aspirations of the reg-
ulatory state. I have tried to import some of the flexibility and poten-
tial efficiency of the common law, while at the same time recognizing
the need for democracy to lie at the heart of whatever regulatory solu-
tions we come up with.
This approach is very simple. I want to argue first for information
and second for economic incentives. The preferred remedy for envi-
4. See Cass R. Sunstein, Democratizing America Through Law, 25 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 949, 955 (1991) (citing THOMAS TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING 41-45 (1985)).
5. STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION 24-27 (1993).
6. See id.
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ronmental problems should be disclosure of information. Regulation
should be the secondary remedy if there is a reason why information
does not work. Information first, regulation second. What we have
done over the past generation is the opposite. Centralized govern-
mental regulation has been the first option, and information has been
disclosed only if the regulatory option has been rebutted.
Now let me just specify what I mean by information and eco-
nomic incentives, emphasizing the democracy-reinforcing features of
both of these remedies. By information, I mean that in areas such as
environmental risks in the workplace or consumer products, with
some risks that reasonable people might take, the preferred choice
ought to be to let people know about the risk rather than to have
government-mandated safety levels. We should have a decent floor so
that risks that no reasonable person would take will not be available.
But otherwise, we should allow for private flexibility.
This ought to be efficiency promoting, and it also ought to be
democracy promoting. One of the real pathologies of our current sys-
tem is that people do not know about the levels of risk that they face.
Hence, it is wrongly thought that nuclear power and toxic waste
dumps are top priorities, while indoor air pollution and smoking are
towards the bottom. Public assessments of risk levels are all over the
map, and that is partly because information is lacking.
We ought to move in the direction of something like a national
warning system. This system would reveal risk levels in a way that
would have an efficiency-promoting aspect, a democracy-promoting
aspect, and a coordinating function. The system would show people
what OMB has publicized a bit-that is, what the risk levels are in
various sectors of the economy and various aspects of people's lives.
By information, I do not mean just disclosure as a preferred rem-
edy. I mean to endorse also a version of Judge Breyer's suggestion
that somewhere in the Federal Government there ought to be an over-
view entity.7 This body would be charged with comparing risk levels,
with ensuring that there are priorities, with exempting tiny risks, as in
the Delaney clause,8 and with ensuring that we get the biggest bang
for the buck. There is no reason that government regulation of the
environment should be as uncoordinated as it now is. Currently, re-
sponsibility for environmental protection is broken up among a
number of different federal agencies, and even offices within EPA
have such different mandates that sensible priority setting is
impossible.
7. Id. at 60.
8. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1988).
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Thus, my suggestion is disclosure as the preferred remedy and an
overview entity that collects information, dispenses information, and
ensures sensible priority setting. That is what I mean by information.
You have heard a bit about economic incentives. What I want to
suggest right now is that economic incentives not only promote effi-
ciency, but, equally importantly, have a democracy-reinforcing fea-
ture. From the democratic point of view, this makes economic
incentives much better than the command-and-control system.
Here is why. Economic incentives focus democratic attention on
the question of ends: "How much clean-up at what price?" Incentives
do not focus on the question of means: "Which technology is best?"
So in thinking about acid rain or any pollutant, the economic incentive
approach puts into Congress' hopper the issue not of which technol-
ogy ought to be imposed, but instead what level of pollution makes
best sense.
The issue of ends forces elective representatives to make the
tradeoff between environmental and other values explicitly and
openly in a way that the current attention to means does not. Not
only is there a democratic advantage in focusing on the right question,
there also is a democratic advantage in eliminating the special interest
deals that are likely when attention is placed on the issue of means. If
the question is ethanol, methanol, nethanol, or thethanol, then it is
especially likely that a group with a stake in the outcome will choose
one of those. If the issue is instead how much reduction are we going
to get, then the very generality of the question is likely to decrease the
influence of factions.
The attention to economic incentives eliminates the attention to
means, reduces factional power, and puts the democratic attention
where it ought to be; it also forces a kind of coordinating and compar-
ative judgment that would be a great advantage. If we had economic
incentives as our remedy of choice, then the question would be: "Well,
we spend X amount for that, how much should we spend for this?"
Thus, economic incentives have a built-in mechanism that is democ-
racy reinforcing in the sense that incentives make it very likely that
comparisons will be obtained. When comparisons are obtained, dem-
ocratic judgments are less subject to factions or to sensationalism.
Economic incentives also put a high premium on information. If the
question is how much should we spend to reduce global warming, then
people will obtain a lot of information about the cost to reduce green-
house gases and about the benefits of doing it. That would be a big
democratic advantage over our current system.
The failures of private law and common law are economic, but
also democratic. The promise of informational remedies and eco-
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nomic incentives is not only economic, but also, more fundamentally,
democratic.
Thank you.
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